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AND FOR SO LONG THEREAFTER. . .
"PAYING QUANTITIES", "SHUTTING-IN" AND 
OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE SECONDARY TERM
A PRESENTATION BEFORE THE 1991 ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW INSTITUTE
By: Thomas A. Daily
An oil and gas lease is a contract between the owner of underground oil and gas (the 
"Lessor") and a prospector (the "Lessee"). The Lessee is granted exclusive exploration and 
development rights. Consideration to the Lessor includes some fraction of anticipated 
production (the "royalty"). The grant is first for a term of years. That term, called the 
"primary term", can be absolutely vested, as in the case of the "paid-up lease"; or it can be 
just one year followed by successive annual renewal options which the Lessee may exercise by 
payment of a specified sum ("delay rental"). In either case, the primary term is relatively 
short, considering the time ordinarily required to fully develop and produce. For that reason, 
virtually every oil and gas lease also contains language permitting it to be perpetuated beyond 
its primary term, if, at the end of the primary term, one of several conditions is present.
An oil and gas lease will not expire at the end of its primary term if the Lessee 
commences operations prior to expiration and those operations are continuously prosecuted. 
Even if those operations result in a dry hole, the Lessee can continue the lease by commencing 
operations for additional drilling within sixty days1 from the cessation of the first operations. 
The typical lease form also contains a "force majeure clause" which purports to preclude 
termination should drilling operations be prevented during the last year of the primary term 
by force majeure. These extenders of the primary term all have one thing in common—they 
are temporary.
Drilling operations someday will end. Force majeure likewise can be expected to end
1or some other stated time.
sooner or later. 2 Ultimately, an oil and gas lease will continue on into the secondary term 
only if production occurs.
This lease shall remain in force for a primary term o f ________
years and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other hydrocarbons is 
produced from said lease premises or from lands pooled 
therewith. 3
It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of
______ years from date (herein called primary term) and as long
thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them is produced from said 
land by the lessee. 4
In theory, the secondary term of the oil and gas lease can last forever, provided the 
Lessee is fortunate enough to find perpetual production. Unfortunately, from the standpoint 
of the Lessee, there are many ways for the secondary term to end prior to eternity. We shall 
consider a few of those.
PAYING QUANTITIES
The Habendum Clauses of both the A. A. P. L. 680 and the Producer’s 88 Lease Forms 
extend the leasehold for as long as oil or gas is "produced". Read literally, these clauses would 
extend the lease if there was any production, regardless how pitiful and, regardless how 
dismal the future outlook. However, the courts of oil and gas producing states are virtually 
unanimous in finding that "production" means more than just any production. It means 
production in "paying quantities". 5
Courts have not been nearly so unanimous when it comes to defining "paying
2If a force majeure becomes permanent, it is doubtful that anyone else would want the
lease anyway. The issue then might well be whether or not a compensable inverse
condemnation has occurred.
3A. A. P. L. Form 680 Oil and Gas Lease. "Habendum Clause"
4Producer’s 88 Oil and Gas Lease Form. "Habendum Clause"
5Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 290 Ark. 481, 721 S. W. 2d 626 (1986); Barnard v. Gibson. 00 
Cal. App. 2d 527, 224 P. 2d 90 (1950); Adolf v. Stearns, 235 Kan. 622, 684 P. 2d 372 (1934); 
Cumberland Contracting Company v. Coffey, 405 S. W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1966); Michigan Wisconsin 
Pipeline Co. v. Michigan National Bank, 118 Mich. App. 74, 324 N.W. 2d 541 (1982); Henry v. Clay, 
274 P. 2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (1942); In Louisiana, 
the same result is required by statute. See, LSA-R. S. 31: 124.
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quantities". An analysis of the many relevant decisions yields two possible approaches, the 
"arithmetic" test and the "prudent operator" test. Under the arithmetic test the court simply 
compares the revenue from the well or wells on the lease premises with certain expenses of the 
well(s) over some relevant period and, if income exceeds expenses, the production is in "paying 
quantities". If not, the lease expires. 6
Courts which use the prudent operator test first perform the same arithmetical 
analysis. If that exercise yields a profit, then paying quantities are found. If not, the prudent 
operator test still yields "paying quantities" if, notwithstanding the unprofitable arithmetic, 
a reasonably prudent operator would continue to produce the well anyway. 7
PAYING QUANTITIES - THE ARITHMETIC TEST
At first blush the arithmetic test appears easy for a court to apply. Either the well 
makes money or it doesn’t, right? Wrong. There is plenty left for lawyers to argue about. For 
example, which expenses should be off-set against income from a well? The authorities agree 
that drilling, completing, equipping, testing and reworking costs are not to be included. 8 The 
Lessee has already spent these and should be entitled to recoup as much of them as possible, 
if they can be recouped without additional loss.
On the other hand, labor costs are clearly off-settable against income. 9 Taxes on 
production and production equipment are also included. 10 Depreciation on original equipment 
should not be included since it is part of the cost of original drilling, 11 but depreciation on
6Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 26. 7 (g) [1979 Replacement].
7Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 26. 7 (f) [1979 Replacement].
8See Summers Oil and Gas § 306 and those cases cited in footnote 25 thereto.
9Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 290 Ark. 481, 721 S. W. 2d 626 (1986); Edwards v. Hardwick, 
350 P. 2d 495 (Okla. 1960); Kerr v. Hillenberg, 373 P. 2d 66 (Okla. 1962); Fick v. Wilson, 349 S. W. 2d 
622 (Tex. App. 1961); Persky v. First State Bank, 117 S. W. 2d 861 (1938).
10Henry v. Clay, 274 P. 2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Fick v. Wilson, 349 S. W. 2d 622 (Tex. App. 1961).
11Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S. W. 2d 684 (1959).
3
production equipment should be included12. That equipment presumably could be salvaged 
and used for some other purpose. It is unclear whether a well should be charged with some 
share of the operator’s overhead expenses. Cases from Kansas and Texas indicate that some 
overhead expenses can be included. 13 Oklahoma clearly excludes them. 14 Royalties paid to 
the Lessor should be included. 15 Overriding royalties, on the other hand, have usually been 
excluded. 16 Excluding overriding royalties makes sense, since to do otherwise would require 
an examination of the relationship between each working interest owner and override owner, 
to determine whether the override was truly an expense or merely a division of income.
To what period of time do we apply our arithmetic? 17 The selection of the appropriate 
time frame within which to measure paying quantities is critical. While there are some wells 
that have never made a profit and, for that matter, never will, many marginal wells were 
profitable at first but have become less profitable as their reserves depleted. Other factors, 
like state mandated production allowables, price fluctuations, purchasers’ takes from the well 
and supply and demand in general make nonsense of any arbitrary testing period. The fact 
that a well is not producing a profit over a given period is merely one factor. To become 
obsessed with that factor is to ignore the realities of the industry. The arbitrary selection of 
a time period can make a profitable well unprofitable or vice versa. Either way, no study of 
the past considers prospects for the future. It’s unfair to deprive the Lessee of his investment 
if there is reasonable basis to expect better times ahead for the well, as may well be the case
12Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer, 163 Tex. 336, 356 S.W. 2d 774 (1961).
13Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 583 P. 2d 885 (1976); Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer, 
163 Tex. 336, 356 S.W. 2d 774 (1961).
14Mason v. Ladd Petroleum Corp., 630 P. 2d 1283 (Okla. 1981).
15Henry v. Clay, 274 P. 2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer, 163 Tex. 336, 356 S.W. 2d 
774 (1961).
16Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 616, 191 P. 2d 129 (1948); Hininger v. 
Kaiser, 738 P. 2d 137 (Okla. 1987); Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (1959).
For a comprehensive list of the multitude of cases dealing with the appropriate time 
period, see the annotation at 43 A.L.R. 3d 8 § 7, beginning at 43 A.L.R. 60.
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in times of low prices, low demand, low production allowables or some combination of these, 
the reversal of which might reasonably be forecast. Indeed, under such circumstances, the 
Lessee should be praised. He takes a licking and keeps on ticking, so to speak, so that in the 
end both he and the Lessor might profit when adverse marketing conditions improve.
In recent times, one state, Kansas, has embraced the arithmetic test and specifically 
rejected subjective considerations. In Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson18, the Kansas Supreme 
Court stated:
In our opinion, the better approach is to follow the innumerable 
cases which apply an objective test, where the determination of 
'paying quantities’ turns upon a mathmatical computation. (See 
cases accumulated in Annot. 43 A.L.R. 3rd 8 [1972]; 21 J. B. A. K. 320 
[1953]; and 2 Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26. 7 
[1964]. 19
With all due respect to the Kansas Court, the authorities upon which it relies are not all that 
innumerable. 20
PAYING QUANTITIES - THE PRUDENT OPERATOR TEST 
The prudent operator test recognizes that unless the Lessee is trying to hold on to the 
lease for purely speculative purposes, his interest, and those of the Lessor, are common. 
Unlike the Lessor, and unlike most judges and virtually all juries, the Lessee is in a good 
position to know whether or not a well is worth keeping. There are many cases which apply 
this test. 21 Probably its most honored statement is in the landmark Texas case of Clifton v. 
Koontz22:
18220 Kan. 300, 553 P. 2d 885 (1976).
19553 P. 2d at 897.
20Indeed the thrust of Professor Kuntz’ treatise cited in Reese v. Lawson is contrary to that 
decision: "There are innumerable cases hereinafter cited which purport to apply an objective 
test, with the determination turning upon a mathematical computation. In application, 
however, the two tests tend to blend in such a manner that the difference is largely one of 
emphasis. "K untz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 26. 7 [1979 Replacement].
21See 43 A.L.R. 3d 8 § 10, beginning on page 73 and those cases cited therein.
22160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (1959).
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In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the 
standard by which paying quantities is determined is whether or 
not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent 
operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not 
merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner 
in which the well in question was operated.
In determining paying quantities, in accordance with the above 
standard, the trial court necessarily must take into consideration 
all matters which would influence a reasonable and prudent 
operator. Some of the factors are: The depletion of the reservoir 
and the price for which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the 
relative profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating 
and marketing costs of the lease, his net profit, the lease 
provisions, a reasonable period of time under the circumstances, 
and whether or not the lessee is holding the lease merely for 
speculative purposes. 23
The majority of oil and gas jurisdictions which have specifically chosen between the tests 
have chosen the prudent operator test, many citing Clifton v. Koontz with approval. 24
PAYING QUANTITIES - THE ARKANSAS CASES
Over the years, at least three Arkansas cases have dealt with the definition of "paying
quantities". In Reynolds v. McNeill25, the issue was whether a lease had terminated for failure
of an oil well to produce in paying quantities. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice George Rose Smith, upheld the lease. While Reynolds v. McNeill, like many
other early cases, fails to articulate the prudent operator test with the precision found in
Clifton v. Koontz26, it is clear that the Court did consider subjective factors:
Peterson had drilled the well, and his statement as to its initial 
production is entitled to much more weight than that of other 
witnesses who had little or no personal knowledge of the facts.
• • •
The Chancellor was right in refusing to declare a forfeiture. The
23325 S.W. 2d 684 at 691.
24Webb v. Hardage Corporation, 471 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1985) (applying LSA-R. S. 
31: 124); Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Michigan National Bank, 118 Mich. App. 74. 324 
N. W. 2d 541 (1982); Barby v. Singer, 648 P. 2d 14 (Okla. 1982); Henry v. Clay, 274 P. 2d 545 (Okla. 
1954). See, also, Cumberland Contracting Company v. Coffee, 405 S. W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1966).
25218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W. 2d 723 (1951).
26160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (1959).
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We are not willing to say that the Chancellor was wrong in giving 
the appellee sixty days of grace in which to resume paying 
production. The lessee has never relaxed his efforts to make the 
well profitable to the lessors. When the output of saltwater 
became too great for the pump, Peterson removed the pipe and 
installed a larger one in the hope of increasing the withdrawal of 
oil. After Peterson gave up the well, McNeill took it over and 
was about to begin cleaning out the sand when the lessors 
abruptly decided that a forfeiture had occurred months before.
Dan Reynolds testified with commendable candor that he thought 
the well had possibilities and that if the lease should be cancelled, 
he intended to try to rework the well by removing the sand in the 
casing. McNeill and those working with him, have expended over 
forty thousand dollars in attaining production and in attempting 
to continue that production. They have not abandoned their 
efforts for any appreciable time. The Appellants did not make 
their dissatisfaction known until three days before suit was filed.
They are not in the position to complain of the Chancellor’s 
ruling.
Then, thirty five years after Reynolds v. McNeill, came the bombshell case of Turner v. 
Reynolds Metal Co. 27. In 1951, Homer and Jean Turner executed an oil and gas lease which 
was assigned to Reynolds Metal Company. During the primary term of the lease, Reynolds 
drilled and completed a gas well known as the "J. T. Nichols #1" in a unit which included the 
lands covered by the lease. Exhibits filed with the trial court show production from the well 
from June of 1964 forward. In the last seven months of 1964, the well produced 15, 402 MCF
27290 Ark. 481, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (1986).
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lessee and his assignees had spent large sums in successfully 
attaining production within the primary term of six months. 
When that event occurred, a valuable estate vested in the lessee, 
to continue as long as oil or gas was produced in paying 
quantities.
The appellants contend, however, that the estate terminated at 
the end of the primary term because oil was no longer being 
produced in commercial amounts. According to the weight of 
authority, and we think the better view, when the lessee’s estate 
has vested it does not automatically terminate upon a temporary 
cessation of production. In ventures of this kind, the lessee makes 
a very substantial investment and bears the entire loss if the well 
is unproductive. It would be harsh and inequitable to say that 
upon a temporary stoppage of production, the lessor can declare 
a forfeiture and take over the property himself. Hence, most 
authorities allow the lessee a reasonable time within which to 
reinstate paying production.
of gas. In subsequent years, the production was: 1965, 13, 168 MCF; 1966, 9, 443 MCF; 1967, 
7, 206 MCF; 1968, 6, 344 MCF; (1969 production is not shown due to an apparent colation error 
in the exhibit); 1970, 6, 814 MCF; 1971, 8, 665 MCF; 1972, 6, 989 MCF; 1973, 7, 344 MCF; 1974, 
6, 301 MCF; 1975, 5, 312 MCF; 1976, 6, 576 MCF; 1977, 6, 031 MCF; 1978, 6, 503 MCF; 1979, 6, 119 
MCF; 1980, 4, 594 MCF; 1981, 3, 198 MCF. These numbers indicate an extremely marginal well. 
Production allowables were apparently not the problem, because production figures for other 
wells within the same field are much much higher. There is no evidence in the record 
whether the well was capable of producing at greater volumes, but presumably it was not. 
The well’s woes were complicated by a long term gas contract entered into between Reynolds 
and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company which set a price of 27 cents per MCF for the gas. That 
contract was set to expire July 1, 1984. In 1975, Reynolds apparently realized that the 
revenues from the Nichols Well put it in the marginal category. On July 8 of that year, it 
obtained an agreement from the Turners and other Lessors that, in consideration of a cash 
payment, the lease would continue until July 8, 1980 notwithstanding production, and 
thereafter as long as there was production. Production at the above levels continued for the 
five years covered by the agreement and thereafter. In February of 1981, after the five year 
extension term had expired, Reynolds wrote Arkla asking for a higher price on gas produced 
from any new wells on the lease and, in October of that year, Arkla agreed that gas from any 
new wells would be purchased at the NGPA new gas price which was about $1. 50 per MCF. 
Reynolds promptly applied for a drilling permit for a new well. Before that well could be 
commenced, Mrs. Turner28, sued for cancellation of the lease, alleging that the first Nichols 
well had failed to produce in paying quantities. Although Mrs. Turner’s complaint uses the 
term "cancellation", it is apparent that she really sought a declaratory judgment that the lease 
had expired of its own terms, for failure to produce in paying quantities. Undaunted, on 
February 9, 1982, Reynolds commenced the drilling of the Nichols #2 Well and it was 
completed on July 9, 1982. According to the completion report filed with Arkansas Oil and
28then a widow
8
Gas Commission it is capable of producing over a million cubic feet of gas (1, 000 MCF) per 
day.
The case was submitted to the court on stipulated facts including the pitiful revenue 
produced by the first well and the fact that Reynolds had paid a pumper $13, 200 per year to 
look after that well and nine others. Because the case was submitted on stipulation, there was 
no testimony either way as to whether or not a prudent operator would have continued to 
produce the well, notwithstanding the fact that it was losing money. 29
The trial court held that the #1 Nichols Well had produced in paying quantities and 
refused to terminate the lease. Mrs. Turner appealed and the Supreme Court reversed. 30
In its opinion, written by Justice Darrell Hickman, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
compared the revenue from the #1 Nichols Well between 1975 and the middle of 1982 to 1/10 
of the pumper’s annual salary. On that basis the well had lost money in every year of the 
secondary term and had failed to produce in paying quantities. Little mention was made of 
Reynolds efforts to secure a higher price or of the new well. It is obvious that the Court 
thought Reynolds had taken those actions only when prodded by the lawsuit. The Court’s 
opinion contains no discussion of prudent operations nor does it mention Reynolds v. McNeill31 
Even though that case is cited in both parties' briefs. 32
Turner v. Reynolds has been subjected to considerable criticism. 33 If the case means 
simple arithmetic determines "paying quantities" in Arkansas, it deserves that criticism and
29One can imagine that a prudent operator, called as an expert witness, would have been 
able to foresee better days ahead with the old gas purchase contract expiring and the 
successful re-negotiation of the price for gas from new wells. Indeed, by November, 1985, 
when the stipulation was submitted to the trial Court, the old gas purchase contract had 
expired and the #1 well had been eligible for the higher price for over a year. Moreover, the 
#2 well was by any standard, a good well.
30Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 290 Ark. 481, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (1986).
31218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W. 2d 723 (1951).
32Neither party cited cases from other jurisdictions having to do with the appropriate test
for measuring "paying quantities".
33See, e.g., Norvell, Discussion Notes, 92 O. & G. R. 247.
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more. On the other hand, there is plenty of justification for its result. After its first two 
years, the #1 Nichols Well never produced more than 10, 000 MCF per year. Even at $1.50 per 
MCF that’s less than $15, 000 per year; not much for a gas well, in this day and age. The 
pumper’s salary was the only expense proven at the trial, but the well surely had other 
expenses. Remember also that the $1. 50 price was not available until the well had produced 
for twenty years, meanwhile yielding next to nothing. The Court could easily have found that 
no prudent operator would have produced the well for such a long time, unless motivated by 
pure speculation. In other words, the Court could easily have applied the analysis of Clifton
Q i
v. Koontz 34 and reached exactly the same result. Then, the only legitimate criticism would 
have to do with the Court’s repeated use of the term "cancellation" when it probably meant 
that the lease had expired of its own terms.
The following year the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case of Perry v. Nicor 
Exploration34 5. The Perry case presents somewhat different facts. It involved a good well. 
However, some of the leases were committed to long-term gas purchase contracts paying 170 
per MCF. Other leases were contracted for prices up to $1. 74 per MCF. The Court held that 
the well, as a whole, had produced in paying quantities, and found it immaterial that certain 
of the leases had not produced a profit, in and of themselves. 36 The Court never needed to 
discuss the prudent operator standard since the well, as a whole, was profitable arithmetically.
An analysis of these Arkansas cases yields few, if any, answers. The Court used 
subjective considerations in Reynolds v. McNeill37, it used simple arithmetic in Turner v. 
Reynolds Metal Co. 38, and, in Perry v. Nicor Exploration39, it didn’t need to dwell on either
34160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (1959).
35293 Ark. 417, 738 S.W. 2d 414 (1987).
36In Arkansas, the base 1/8th royalty is paid out of 1/8th of all proceeds of production, 
pooled for that purpose (A. C. A. § 15-72-305 (a). Thus, Lessors of the 170 leases were receiving 
more than 1/8th of 170 and, by the same token, Lessors of the $1.74 leases were receiving much 
less than 1/8th of $1.74.
372 1 8 Ark. 453, 456 S.W. 2d 723 (1951. )
38290 Ark. 481, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (1986).
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approach. Jurisprudence might have been better served by the utilization of the prudent 
operator standard in Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co. but it is doubtful that the result would have 
been any different. 40 Also, the Court constantly talked of "cancellation”, but the apparent 
holding was that the lease had expired of its own terms.
PAYING QUANTITIES - "EXPIRATION" OR "CANCELLATION"
If the primary term has expired and the well stops producing in paying quantities does 
the lease automatically expire of its own terms, or must it be cancelled? If the secondary 
term lasts only "so long thereafter" as there are paying quantities, then it would seem the lease 
should expire. That has been the result, according to Professor Kuntz, in Kansas, New York, 
Texas, New Mexico, Illinois, Tennessee, California, Nebraska, Lousiana, Michigan, Montana 
and Ohio. 41
On the other hand, since most habendum clauses literally only require "production", 
paying quantities being implicit therein, a court could reasonably hold that some production, 
though not in paying quantities, might hold the lease after paying quantities cease to be 
produced, until the lease is cancelled in an action brought by the Lessor. Several states have 
so held, or implied. According to Professor Kuntz, they are Colorado, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Wyoming, and possibly Indiana and North Dakota. 42 
Oklahoma is perhaps the staunchest "cancellation" jurisdiction. The Oklahoma case most often 
cited is Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp. 43:
The ' thereafter’ clause is hence not ever to be regarded as akin
39293 Ark. 417, 738 S.W. 2d 414 (1987).
40For a case remarkably similar to Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., see Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., 
266 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1990). In that case the California Court held that a lease had expired for 
failure to produce an arithmetical profit and failed to give any mention to subjective 
considerations. However, it is doubtful that a prudent operator would think much of the well 
in that case either.
41Kuntz, the Law of Oil and Gas, § 26-8 [Replacement 1989].
42Ibid
43604 P. 2d 854 (Okla. 1979).
11
in effect to the common law conditional limitation or 
determinable fee estate. The occurence of the limiting event or 
condition does not automatically effect an end to the right.
Rather, the clause is to be regarded as fixing the life of a lease 
instead of providing means of terminating it in advance of the 
time at which it would otherwise expire. In short, the lease 
continues in existence so long as interuption of production in 
paying quantities does not extend for a period longer than 
reasonable or justifiable in light of all the circumstances 
involved. But under no circumstances will cessation of 
production in paying quantities ipso facto deprive the lessee of 
his extended term estate. 44
Professor Kuntz also lists Arkansas as a "cancellation" state, citing Reynolds v. McNeill 45. As
noted above, the Arkansas Court also speaks of cancellation in Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co. 46,
but the Court treats the lease as having expired. Reynolds argued passionately that equity
abhors a forfeiture and cited the potential loss of its newly drilled well as the dire
consequence of such a forfeiture. The Court turned a deaf ear saying:
Reynolds later negotiated a higher purchase price for the gas in 
February 198547 and in 1982 drilled a second well which will 
produce when connected to a pipeline. However, these efforts are 
irrelevant because they were made after Turner was entitled to 
cancel the lease. 48
These considerations would be very relevant if cancellation was at issue, since cancellation is 
equitable in nature and equity does indeed abhor a forfeiture. If, however, the Court meant 
to say "the lease had expired" then such considerations would truly be irrelevant.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF LACK OF MARKET 
Suppose the Lessee drills a well during the primary term but is not actually marketing 
production from the well when the primary term expires. Suppose, also, that the particular
44604 P. 2d at 858.
45218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W. 2d 723 (1951).
46290 Ark. 481, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (1986).
47The Court probably meant 1981.
48290 Ark. 481 at 484, 721 S.W. 2d 626 at 628.
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lease has no shut-in clause. 49 In some states, "production" requires marketing and, therefore, 
failure to market at the expiration of the primary term would cause the lease to expire. Those 
states include Texas50, Louisiana51, New Mexico52 and Kansas53. According to Professor 
Kuntz, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee follow that view as well. 54 In these states the 
lease is saved only if it contains a shut-in clause which permits the Lessee to shut-in the well 
and pay a minumum royalty.
The courts of several other states have held that a discovery of paying quantities is 
equivalent to "production" in paying quantities. These states include West Virginia55, 
Montana56, Wyoming57 and, most notably Oklahoma58. In these states, a shut-in clause is not 
a necessity as long as the Lessee acts as a prudent operator to find a market for the production.
The Arkansas Court has apparently never decided this issue.
In all states, the Lessee can hold the lease with a shut-in well if the lease contains a 
shut-in gas clause and if the Lessee complies with the terms of that clause. It must be
49Most modern oil and gas leases do contain shut-in clauses but this is not just an academic 
exercise. The answer impacts significantly upon the result when the Lessee fails to timely pay 
shut-in royalty under its shut-in clause.
50Union Oil of Cal. v. Ogden, 278 S.W. 2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 
540, 261 S.W. 2d 311 (1953).
51 Smith v. Sun Oil Co., Inc., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931); Landry v. Flaitz, 245 La. 223, 157 
S. 2d 892 (1963).
52 Town of Tome Land Grant, Inc. v. Ringle Development Co., 56 N.M. 101, 240 P. 2d 850 (1952); 
Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245, 479 P. 2d 294 (1970).
53Reese Enterprises. Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 553 P. 2d 885 (1986).
54Kuntz, the Law of Oil and Gas § 26. 6 [1979 replacement].
55Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W.Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909); South Penn Oil Co. v. 
Snodgrass, 71 W.Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1913).
56Fey v. A.A. Oil Corp., 129 Mont. 300, 285 P. 2d 578 (1955).
57Pryor Mt. Oil and Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 P. 570 (1924).
58McVicker v. Horn, Robinson and Nathan, 322 P. 2d 410, 71 A.L.R. 2d 1211 (Okla. 1958)
13
emphasized, however, that no shut-in gas well will hold a lease in its secondary term unless
that well is capable of producing in paying quantities. 59 A Lessee cannot hold a lease by
60completing a non-commercial well, shutting it in and paying shut-in royalty.
FAILURE TO TIMELY PAY SHUT-IN ROYALTY 
What if a well is drilled during the primary term which is capable of producing in 
paying quantities, but is shut-in for lack of a market. Then what if the Lessee either fails to 
pay shut-in royalty or pays it incorrectly? Does the lease terminate? In states like Oklahoma, 
where discovery is equivalent to production, the lease will not terminate61 although the Lessor 
is probably entitled to recover the shut-in royalties in an action for debt. 62 In those 
jurisdictions like Texas, where marketing is required, failure to timely pay shut-in royalty 
has been fatal. 63
It would be easy to generalize that the consequence of failure to properly pay shut in 
royalty is always determined by whether a state requires marketing or merely discovery for 
purposes of the Habendum clause. Remember, though, that each oil and gas lease is a separate 
contract. These contracts are not all identical. This is particularly true of shut-in clauses. 
Compare this clause:
During any period (whether before or after expiration of the 
primary term hereof) when gas is not being so sold or used and 
the well or wells are shut-in and there is no current production 
of oil or operations on said leased premises sufficient to keep this 
lease in force, Lessee shall pay or tender a royalty of One Dollar 
($1. 00) per year net royalty acre retained herein, such payment or 
tender to be made, on or before the anniversary date of this lease
59Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 46. 4 (e) [1990 Replacement].
60Ibid
61Flag Oil Corp. v. King Resources Co. 494 P. 2d 322 (Okla).
62Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 46. 5 [Replacement 1990].
63Rogers v. Osborne, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W. 2d 311 (1953); Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 
141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W. 2d 339 (1943); Amber Oil and Gas Company v. Bratton, 711 S.W. 2d 741 
(Tex. App. 1986); Steeple Oil and Gas Corporation v. Amend, 392 S.W. 2d 744 (Tex. App. 1965); 
Hastings v. Pichinson, 370 S.W. 2d 1 (Tex. App. 1963); Steeple Oil and Gas Corp. v. Amend, 337 
S.W. 2d 809 (Tex. App. 1960); Reid v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 323 S.W. 2d 107 (Tex. App. 1959).
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next insuing after the expiration of ninety (90) days from the 
date such well is shut-in and thereafter on the anniversary date 
of this lease during the period such well is shut-in, to the royalty 
owners or to the royalty owners’ credit in the rental depository 
bank hereinafter designated. When such payment or tender is made 
it will be considered that gas is being produced within the meaning 
of the entire lease. 64
with this:
If a well capable of producing gas or gas and gas condensate in 
paying quantities located on the leased premises (or on acreage 
pooled or consolidated with all or a portion of the leased premises 
into a unit for the drilling or operation of such well) is at any 
time shut-in and no gas or gas condensate therefrom is sold or 
used off the premises or for the manufacture of gasoline or other 
products, nevertheless such shut-in well shall be deemed to be a well 
on the leased premises producing gas in paying quantities and this 
lease will continue in force during all of the time or times while such 
well is so shut-in, whether before or after the expiration of the 
primary term hereof. Lessee shall use reasonable diligence to 
market gas or gas condensate capable of being produced from 
such shut-in well but shall be under no obligation to market such 
products under terms, conditions or circumstances which, in 
Lessee’s judgment, exercised in good faith, are unsatisfactory.
Lessee shall be obligated to pay or tender to Lessor within 45 days 
after the expiration of each period one year in length (annual 
period) during which such well is so shut-in, as royalty, an 
amount equal to the annual delay rental herein provided 
applicable to the interest of Lessor in acreage embraced in this 
lease as of the end of such annual period and included within the 
confines of a pooled unit declared under the terms hereof or 
created by order, rule or regulation of any governmental 
authority; provided that, if gas or gas condensate from such well 
is sold or used as aforesaid before the end of any such annual 
period, or if, at the end of such annual period, this lease is being 
maintained in force and effect otherwise than by reason of such 
shut-in well, Lessee shall not be obligated to pay or tender, for 
that particular annual period, such sum of money. Such payment 
shall be deemed a royalty under all provisions of this lease. 65
A careful examination of these clauses reveals that two distinctly different events are the
conditions that hold the lease. In the first, the payment of shut-in royalty itself perpetuates
the lease. In contrast, in the second clause, just completing the well is the lease perpetuating
condition. Payment of shut-in royalty is still required, but it is specifically denominated "a
royalty". Under this sort of shut-in clause, failure to timely pay shut-in royalty should not be
64Producers 88 (Oklahoma) lease form. "Shut-in clause" (emphasis supplied).
65A.A.P.L. Form 680 oil and gas lease. "Shut-in Clause" (emphasis supplied).
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fatal, even in jurisdictions like Texas. 66
Now, the $64 question. A Lessee completes an Arkansas gas well capable of producing 
in paying quantities. The well is several miles from the nearest pipeline. The Lessee 
concludes that the best course of action is to shut-in the well until further development in off­
setting drilling units will justify the cost of transporting the gas from the well. Then, by 
inadvertance, the Lessee fails to pay shut-in royalty when it becomes due. Has the lease 
terminated?
Of course, no one knows the answer to that hypothetical question. In the first place, 
we don’t know whether Arkansas is among those jurisdictions that require marketing as an 
essential part of producing. And, our hypothetical question has something important missing. 
Exactly what does the shut-in clause say? If the shut-in clause makes payment of shut-in 
royalty a condition, then the Court should hold that the lease has terminated unless it follows 
decisions like those from Oklahoma to the effect that mere discovery is equivalent to 
production. On the other hand, if the shut-in clause states that shutting in a well capable of 
paying quantities is equivalent to producing it, the lease should not terminate regardless of 
whether the Arkansas Court adopts the Oklahoma rule or the Texas rule. Under such a clause, 
the Lessee is duty bound to pay shut-in royalty, but if he fails to do so inadvertently, he 
doesn’t lose the lease, he just owes a debt.
LESSEE’S IMPLIED COVENANTS
If the Lessee discovers paying quantitites and either markets or shuts-in the product, 
the lease will survive into the secondary term. Even then, though, because of the nature of 
the relationship between the parties, the Lessee owes certain continuing duties to the Lessor. 
These duties are often called "implied covenants". Failure to perform one or more of them
66Incredibly, every one of the Texas cases in Footnote 61 (infra) has involved a clause 
which made payment of shut-in royalty the critical condition. Lessees in Texas might want 
to try the other type of clause to see if it makes any difference.
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may subject the Lessee to cancellation of part or all of the lease67. Nonperformance of an 
implied covenant may also subject the Lessee to liability for damages in a proper case. 68 
Implied covenants which impact upon the secondary term include the Lessee’s duty to drill 
additional development wells69, duty of diligent and proper operation70, duty to market the 
product71, duty to protect against drainage72 and duty of further exploration73. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court has, in dicta, recognized each of these covenants. 74 There is a vast number of 
decisions of courts from oil and gas producing states construing one or more of these duties. 
These decisions reveal many nuances in the law which vary from state to state. In this brief 
discussion, we shall deal only in generalities.
The duty to drill additional development wells begins after the Lessee makes the initial 
discovery of paying quantities. He is then required to continue to drill wells to develop that 
discovery, if a prudent operator would do so. This covenant is probably more important in 
jurisdictions where increased density drilling is permitted. In Arkansas, unless the producing 
formation is part of a common source of supply which was discovered prior to the effective 
date of the Conservation Act75, the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission will not grant a 
production allowable for a second or subsequent well within the same drilling unit if it cannot
67  Which may be immediate or may be conditional upon the Lessee’s failure to come into 
compliance by some court imposed deadline.
68See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas Chapters 54-62 [Replacement 1978].
69See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas Chapter 58.
70See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas Chapter 59.
71See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas Chapter 60.
72See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas Chapter 61.
73See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas Chapter 62.
74Amoco Production Co. v. Ware, 269 Ark. 313, 602 S.W. 2d 620 (1980).
75February 20, 1939. As amended, this act is codified as A. C. A. §15-71-101 through §15- 
72-904.
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be proven that the two wells are not draining the same common source. Since a prudent 
operator is not required to drill a well he can’t legally produce, most further development 
within the drilling unit would be imprudent.
The duty of diligent and prudent operation is a catch-all. An example of a claimed 
breach of this covenant is in Amoco Production Co. v. Ware76. There the plaintiff sought 
cancellation claiming that the Lessee had failed to act as a prudent operator when it withdrew 
its appeal of an Oil and Gas Commission order establishing 160 acre drilling units instead of 
80 acre units. In that case, the Arkansas Supreme Court gave deference to the Lessee’ good 
faith judgment and held that no covenant had been breached.
The Lessee’s duty to market the product is often related to his duty to produce in 
paying quantities and comply with the shut-in clause. As discussed above, the Lessee can only 
perpetuate the lease into the secondary term by finding paying quantities. He can only shut- 
in a well which is capable of production in paying quantities. The Lessee then still has an 
implied duty to try to market the product on favorable terms. If he is not immediately 
successful, he must comply with the shut-in clause. Failure to do so will cause loss of the lease 
or, at minimum, liability for damages. If the Lessee is still unsuccessful in marketing the 
product after a substantial period of time, he becomes susceptible to a two pronged attack. 
Perhaps he has breached the implied covenant to market by not being as aggressive a salesman 
as prudent operations would have dictated. If he has been prudent in his marketing efforts 
then why has he failed? Perhaps he didn’t have paying quantities in the first place.
One recent Arkansas case on the implied covenant to market involves other issues. In 
Taylor v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company77, the plaintiff sought judgment for additional 
royalties because the price being paid to the Lessee was substantially below the current 
market. The gas was contracted for under a long term agreement. The price provided for was 
a favorable price when the agreement was entered into. The United States District Court,
76269 Ark. 313, 602 S.W. 2d 620 (1980).
77604 F. Supp. 779 (W. D. Ark. 1985), affirmed 793 F. 2d. 189.
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applying Arkansas law, held for the Lessee:
The plaintiff has failed to prove that the gas contracts were not 
reasonable or were not executed in good faith or at arm’s length.
The court finds that the prices recited in the Arkla-Stephens 
contracts were at least equal to the prevailing market prices at 
the well at the time of the contracts’ execution. Accordingly, the 
lessor, Taylor, is not entitled to any additional royalties from 
Stephens or Arkla under the market price leases. 78
The physical characteristics of oil and gas make them susceptible to drainage from 
wells nearby. Thus the Lessee has a continuing implied duty to protect the correlative rights 
of his Lessor by drilling to prevent drainage. In most situations the product remains in the 
ground notwithstanding the Lessee’s failure to prudently perform. That is not so when the 
oil or gas has been lost irretrievably to wells on other lands. Thus, violation of this covenant 
is likely to expose the Lessee not only to cancellation but damages as well.
The duty of further exploration differs from the duty to drill additional development 
wells. It implies a duty to explore for production not found in existing wells. For example, 
if the lease covers more than one tract, the Lessee has a duty to prudently explore all tracts. 
Moreover, if a lease is being held only by shallow production and the lands are clearly 
prospective at deeper horizons, the Lessee has been held to a duty to explore deeper. 79
The most common remedy for a Lessee’s breach of implied covenant has been 
cancellation of the lease. Cancellation is an equitable remedy. It is the equivalent of a 
forfeiture and equity abhors a forfeiture. Thus, ordinarily, if a court grants cancellation it 
will permit the Lessee to keep his producing well(s). 80 Cancellation is frequently made 
conditional. In such cases, the Lessee will be given a deadline to comply. Only if he then 
fails to meet the deadline will cancellation occur. 81
78Taylor v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, 604 F. Supp 779 at 784 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
79Stevenson v. Barnes, 288 Ark. 147, 702 S.W. 2d 787 (1986).
80See, e. g ., Stevenson v. Barnes, 288 Ark. 147, 702 S. W. 2d 787 (1986); Nolan v. Thomas, 228 Ark. 
572, 309 S.W. 2d 727 (1958).
81See, e.g., Arkansas Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 281 Ark. 207, 662 S.W. 2d 
824 (1984).
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Also, due to the equitable nature of the remedy, the Lessor usually is required to 
demand compliance before the cancellation will occur. 82 However, in Byrd v. Bradham83, the 
Arkansas Court held that a demand was not required when there had been inactivity for an 
unreasonable length of time (28 years). There has been some concern that this case opens the 
door to surprise cancellations in Arkansas. More likely, its holding is limited to its facts and 
the Arkansas Court would still require notice under most circumstances.
THE PUGH CLAUSE AS A LIMIT ON THE SECONDARY TERM
Some oil and gas leases contain a clause which limits the secondary term to lands
within drilling units where production is discovered during the primary term. Such a clause
is known as a "Pugh Clause", named after Lawrence G. Pugh, who is given credit for its
invention. A typical Pugh Clause might provide:
Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, this lease 
shall expire at the end of its primary term as to all lands 
hereinabove described which are not then contained within an 
established drilling unit containing one or more oil or gas wells 
capable of producing in paying quantities. This lease shall also 
then expire with respect to lands within such drilling units as to 
all those depths below the stratigraphic equivalent of the base of 
the deepest producing formation therein.
A Pugh Clause is an express provision which limits the habendum clause. While it will be
given effect, it needs to be written precisely. In the case of Bibler Brothers Timber Corp. v.
Tojac Minerals, Inc. 84, the Arkansas Court construed a clause which read as follows:
In the event, however, that only a part of the lands embraced by 
this lease are included in a unit created hereunder, that the 
remaining portion of the lands embraced by this lease shall be 
subjct to delay rental payments as provided in Paragraph 4.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that this language did not constitute a Pugh Clause.
Instead, it merely subjected outside acreage to delay rental payments and, since delay rental
82Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas §§ 58.4, 59.4, 60.4, 61.4 and 62.4 [1978 Replacement].
83280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W. 2d 366 (1983).
84281 Ark. 431, 664 S.W. 2d 472 (1984).
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payments were no longer due after the expiration of the primary term, it was then 
meaningless. Also, since the drilling unit formed in Bibler Brothers Timber Corp. v. Tojac 
Minerals85 was formed by compulsory action of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, it was 
not a unit "formed hereunder" within the meaning of the clause in question.
THE "STATUTORY PUGH CLAUSE"
Oklahoma and Arkansas have each adopted statutes limiting the application of
habendum clause in acreage outside of producing units. In Oklahoma, the statute provides:
In case of a spacing unit of one hundred sixty (160) acres or 
more, no oil and/or gas leasehold interest outside the spacing unit 
involved may be held by production from the spacing unit more 
than ninety (90) days beyond expiration of the primary term of 
the lease. 86
This statute was enacted as of May 25, 1977 and has been held to apply only to oil and gas 
leases entered into after that date. 87
Arkansas’ "statutory Pugh Clause" is more complex and somewhat confusing:
(a) The term of an oil and gas lease or oil or gas lease extended 
by production in quantities in lands in one (1) section or pooling 
unit in which there is production shall not be extended in lands 
in sections or pooling units under the lease where there has been 
no production or exploration.
(b) This section shall not apply when drilling operations have 
commenced on any part of lands in sections or pooling units 
under the lease within one (1) year after the expiration of the 
primary term, or within one (1) year after the completion of a 
well on any part of lands in sections or pooling units under the 
lease.
(c) The provisions of this sections shall apply to all oil and gas 
or oil or gas leases entered into on and after July 4, 1983. 88
Apparently this statute means:
(1) If all drilling activity occurs during the primary term of the
65 Ibid.
860kla. Stat. Ann. § 52-87.1.
87Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp. 623 P. 2d 613 (Okla. 1981).
88A.C.A. § 15-73-201.
21
lease, then acreage outside producing units will cease to be leased 
one year after the expiration of the primary term;
(2) If a well is commenced within one year after the expiration 
of the primary term, acreage outside producing units will not 
expire until one year after that well’s completion;
(3) Successive one year extensions can be obtained by the Lessee 
if he continues to commence new wells within the previous "one 
year from completion";
(4) As long as the Lessee commences a well somewhere on the 
leasehold within one year from the previous completion he need 
never drill on all the lands covered by the lease.
It’s also possible to read the statute differently and reach a more absurd conclusion. 
Read literally, Section (b) seems to say that if a well is commenced within one year after 
expiration of the primary term or, at any other time within one year after completion of 
another well on the lease, then the statute just doesn’t apply. Certainly, that is not with the 
legislature meant, but it might be worth arguing.
Another problem with the Arkansas statute is that it does not define "completion". In 
all probability the Supreme Court will someday supply that definition. A likely candidate is 
the date upon which the completion report is filed. However, if that date is adopted, the 
drilling of a dry hole would not entitle the Lessee to another year, since no completion report 
results from a dry hole.
CONCLUSION
The news is bad and good. The secondary term can last forever, in theory. 
Unfortunately, there are many potholes in the road to eternity.
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